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1 Explanatory memorandum 
1.  COMMISSION  REPORT  ON  THE  RATES  AND  STRUCTURE  OF 
EXCISE DUTIES ON MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
This  proposal  for  a Directive  proposes  a number of technical  adjustments to  existing 
Community legislation on the taxation of  manufactured tobacco which the Commission's 
review of  the structure and rates of  excise duty on tobacco has shown to be necessary. 
The review was conducted in accordance with Article 4 of Council Directive 92/79/EEC 
of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of  taxes on cigarettes  t and Article 4 of  Council 
Directive 92/80/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on manufactured 
tobacco other than cigarettes,  2 which state that the rates and structure of excise duties are 
to be reviewed at two-yearly intervals. The Commission is to present a report which may 
or may not be accompanied by proposals revising the Directives.  The conclusions of the 
second review are set out in the attached Commission report. 
The first review in  19953  showed that there was no need for any short-term adaptations 
to  the structure and rates of excise duty on manufactured tobacco to  ensure the smooth 
operation of  the single market.  However, the Commission concluded that a wide-ranging 
consultation  exercise  should  be  held.  During  the  consultations  neither  the  national 
authorities nor the trade organisations came out in favour of fundamental change to  the 
existing tax structure. The Commission therefore took the view that, although it was not 
expedient to  propose fundamental changes in the structure or rates of excise duty, there 
was a need for certaip technical adjustments. 
The report takes into account the smooth operation of  the single market, the real value of 
excise-duty rates and the wider objectives of  the Treaty. 
2.  OPERATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
The rates of  duty on cigarettes in different Member States still differ widely. Despite this, 
no requests for closer convergence were made during the consultation exercise. However, 
it was generally agreed that the technical problems encountered in applying the existing 
rules need to be remedied. 
The overall minimum excise duty on cigarettes is expressed as a perc.entage of the retail 
selling  price.  It is  particularly difficult  to  implement  the  57%  rule  when the  level  of 
taxation in  a Member State is very close to  57% and when changes are planned in  the 
retail selling price or the rate of VAT. Another issue is the way in which the 57% rule is 
applied  in  practice in  the  Member States.  While  bearing  in  mind what  is  feasible,  a 
J 
Council  Directive  92/79/EEC  of 19  October  1992  on  the  approximation  of taxes  on  cigarettes 
(OJ L 316, 31.10.92, p. 8). 
Council  Directive 92/80/EEC of 19  October  1992  on the  approximation of taxes  on  manufactured 
tobacco other than cigarettes (OJ L 316,31.10.1992,  p.  10). 
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2 technical adjustment should be made to  Community legislation so as to  avoid divergent 
interpretations among Member States. The aim is to allow Member States greater leeway 
to adjust the incidence of the overall minimum excise rate in the event of  changes in the 
retail selling price of cigarettes in the most popular price category or changes in VAT 
rates. Similarly, it should be made easier to adjust the specific component of excise duty 
in cases where that component is expressed as a percentage of  the retail selling price. 
The  way  in  which  rules  on  the  taxation  of cigars  are  applied  has  recently  been 
investigated. In one Member State the rules were interpreted as allowing the application 
of  ad  valorem  rates  to  cigars,  subject  to  fixed  specific  minimum  rates.  Some 
Member States feel  that such an approach has its advantages and would be interested in 
incorporating  similar  measures  into  their  legislation  if that  were  permissible  under 
Community law.  The effect of such a measure is  to  increase the  relative incidence of 
taxation on the cheapest products. Similar provisions are already in place for cigarettes 
and  hand-rolling  tobacco.  The  Commission has  therefore  concluded  that  it  would  be 
desirable for the Member States to have the option of levying a minimum rate of excise 
duty on cigars and smoking tobacco as well. 
3.  REAL VALUE OF EXCISE-DUTY RATES 
The review also  looked at  the real  value of excise-duty rates.  National administrations 
generally take inflation into account when drafting their budgets. It can be assumed that, 
all other things being equal, they will usually raise excise-duty rates in line with inflation. 
Since the minimum excise duty on cigarettes is  expressed as  a percentage of the retail 
selling  price,  it  tracks  inflation  automatically  and  so  does  not  require  any  such 
adjustment. After the Member States' decision a few years ago to opt for specific excise 
duties on cigars, smoking tobacco and other tobacco, it is fair to assume that the increases 
in recent years have taken account of inflation. Moreover, an inflation-based adjustment 
in  the  minimum rates  expressed  as  a specific  amount  is  needed  to  maintain  the  ratio 
between  the specific and  the ad valorem  components which was established when the 
rates were initially set. 
4.  WIDER OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY 
Given the criteria laid down for achieving economic and monetary union, it is  essential 
that  Community  excise-duty  policy,  while  aimed  primarily  at  ensuring  the  smooth 
operation of  the single market, should guarantee revenue receipts and sound conditions at 
national  level and should be  consistent with the wider policies of the European Union. 
Where manufactured tobacco products are concerned, particular attention must be paid to 
the  health-protection  aspects  and  to  the  relationship  between  such protection  and  the 
price of  these products. 
Tobacco  is  at  present very heavily taxed  in  most Member States.  This  is  justified on 
public-health grounds  since  it  helps  discourage  consumption.  However,  the  relatively 
high tax on tobacco also encourages fraud.  Consequently, provided that they comply with 
the  minimum  amounts  laid  down  in  Directives  92/79/EEC  and  92/80/EEC,  Member 
States  are  at  liberty  to  determine  their own  levels  of taxation and  to  take  account of 
factors such as health and fraud. 
Under the circumstances, and given that the minimum rate for cigarettes is expressed as a 
percentage, the Commission has decided not to propose any changes in minimum rates. 
3 5.  FREQUENCY OF REVIEWS 
As they stand, Directives 92/79/EEC and 92/80/EEC provide for two-yearly reviews of 
the structure and rates of  excise duty. In the Commission's view, a two-year period is not 
long enough to allow changes in Community legislation to be properly evaluated. A five-
year period would be a more appropriate  length of time to  assess the  operation of the 
single market and the impact of  any amendments to legislation. 
4 Explanation of the articles 
Article 1 
Article  1 amends certain provisions of Directive 92179/EEC  on  the  approximation of 
taxes on cigarettes. 
Point 1 
A new Article 2a is inserted.  The purpose is to allow the Member States greater latitude 
to adjust the incidence of  the overall minimum excise duty in the event of  a change in the 
retail selling price of  cigarettes in the most popular price category. 
The Commission has observed a number of differences in the manner in which the 57% 
rule is applied in the Member States. Some Member States agree with the Commission 
that Artie  I~ 2 of Directive 92179/EEC should be interpreted literally and strictly adhered 
to.  Checking compliance with the rule that the minimum incidence of excise duty must 
not fall below 57% is not linked to the date of 1 January and need not be a once-yearly 
exercise only. On the contrary, compliance with the 57% rule is an ongoing requirement 
which must be met whenever there is a change in retail selling prices, while at the same 
time  the most popular price category,  which  is  established once  a year only,  must be 
respected. Other Member States disagree with this interpretation, arguing that compliance 
with the 57% rule should be checked once a year only. A few Member States agree with 
the strict interPretation but verify the incidence of  excise-duty rates only once a year. 
In practice, it would seem that continuous verification would be impracticable and would 
not even be the best approach.  Moreover, there are other interpretations which, though 
equally  valid,  are  not  entirely  consistent  with  the  strict  interpretation.  However,  a 
situation in which different practices based on divergent interpretations of the  relevant 
legislation  coexist  can  hardly  be  maintained  indefinitely.  In  so  far  as  a  flexible 
interpretation can more readily take account of what is practicable, the Commission has 
opted for a technical adjustment to Community legislation. 
This technical adjustment is  incorporated in paragraph 1.  It gives  a certain amount of 
leeway to  those Member States which interpret the legislation strictly, without however 
calling  into  question  the  vital  role  played  by  the  existing  rules.  Accordingly, 
Member States may  delay adjusting the incidence of the  overall minimum excise duty 
until 1 January of  the second year following the change.  · 
The  purpose of paragraph 2 is  to  reduce  the  automatic  impact of any  increase in  the 
standard VAT rate on the overall taxation of  cigarettes. 
Excise duty includes a component expressed as  a percentage of the goods' retail selling 
price, inclusive of VAT.  VAT itself is also applied to the value ofthe goods inclusive of 
excise duty. A straightforward increase in the VAT rate thus leads to  an increase in the 
absolute burden of excise duty which, in tum, increases the base to which the new VAT 
rate is applied. Moreover, owing to the change in the relative proportions of the different 
components of  the retail selling price, overall excise duty may fall below 57% of  the new 
retail selling price. This makes it necessary to raise excise duty again, thus increasing the 
5 tax base to which the new VAT rate is applied, and so on. This process is known in the 
industry as 'the cascade effect'. 
The  Member  States  are  currently  required  to  apply  the  standard  rate  of VAT  to 
manufactured tobacco. Under current VAT rules, Member States are limited, in principle, 
to  one  standard  rate  and  one  reduced  rate,  the  scope  of the  latter  being  restricted. 
Consequently, if a Member State decides to raise its standard rate, it is obliged to apply 
the higher rate to all goods and services subject to the standard rate. 
There is no other sector in which an  increase in the VAT rate has so  great an  impact. 
National governments may pursue the policies of their choice,  but they should not be 
forced to increase excise duty for purely mechanical reasons, without any particular aim 
inmind.  · 
The Commission therefore proposes that the Member States be authorised, even if only 
temporarily  (see  paragraph  3  below)  to  neutralise  the  impact  on  excise  duty  of an 
increase in the VAT rate, even if, as a result of such an adjustment, the incidence of the 
overall minimum excise duty temporarily falls  below 57% of the retail selling price of 
cigarettes in the most popular price category. 
The aim of  paragraph 3 is to limit the length of time during which Member States can 
reduce the impact of  VAT increases.  · 
Paragraph 2 is not designed to authorise. situations in which the incidence of  the overall 
minimum excise duty remains lower than 57% of the retail selling price of cigarettes in 
the  most  popular price  category in  the  long  term.  The  flexibility  which  the  Member 
States  will  enjoy  must  not  result  in  unfair  competition  between  them  and  must  be 
consistent with the smooth operation of  the single market. 
The Commission thus takes the view that a temporary derogation from the incidence of 
the overall minimum excise rate is acceptable, provided that it applies for a limited time 
only. It therefore proposes that Member States which exercise the neutralisation option 
readjust the incidence ofthe overall minimum excise duty to the level of  57% ofthe retail 
selling price of cigarettes in the most popular price category and that they do this at the 
latest by I January of  the second year following the year in which adjustment took place. 
Point 2 
Article 4 of  Directive 92179/EEC currently states that the Commission must examine the 
structure and rates of  excise duty on cigarettes every two years. 
In  the  Commission's  view,  a  two-year  period  is  not  long  enough  for  changes  in 
Community or national legislation to be properly evaluated. A five-year period would be 
more appropriate in order to assess the operation of the single market and the impact of 
any amendments to legislation. 
Article 4 therefore provides for a review at five-year instead of two-year intervals. The 
next review is due to take place by 31  December 2002 at the latest. The Commission is, 
of course, at liberty to put forward proposals before the end of the five-year period if it 
judges this to be necessary. 
Article 2 
6 Article 2 amends a number of  provisions in Directive 92/80/EEC on the approximation of 
taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes. 
Point 1 
The  Commission  recently  investigated the  way in  which the  rules  on the  taxation of 
cigars  and  hand-rolling  tobacco  are  applied.  Directive  92/80/EC  stipulates  that  the 
Member States must apply to cigars and cigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other types 
of smoking tobacco an excise duty which may be ad valorem, specific or composite. In 
addition,  Member  States  may  levy  a  minimum  excise  duty  on hand-rolling  tobacco, 
provided that this does not increase the total tax burden to more than 90% of  the total tax 
burden on hand-rolling tobacco in the most popular price category. 
The application of  ad valorem or specific rates to cigars and smoking tobacco, subject to 
fixed specific minimum amounts, is not allowed under existing legislation. 
However,  in  one  Member  State  the  rules  have  been  interpreted  as  allowing  the 
application Df ad valorem rates to cigars and smoking tobacco, subject to a fixed specific 
minimum  amount.  The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  this  interpretation  does  not 
comply strictly with the Directive. However, even if a technical infringement exists, the 
approach taken by the Member State in question has not had any adverse effects. The fact 
that it is  illegal for  cigars but completely legal  for cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco 
makes it more difficult to defend or justify the arrangements laid down in the  Directiv~ 
for cigars and smoking tobacco. The Commission has concluded from this that existing 
legislation  must  be  adapted  so  as  to  give  Member  States  the  opportunity  to  levy  a 
minimum excise duty on cigars, cigarillos and smoking tobacco as well. 
The minimum excise duty on cigars, cigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other types of 
smoking tobacco is  expressed both as  a percentage of the retail selling price and as  a 
specific amount. Leaving all other considerations aside, it should be noted that the gap 
between these two  factors widens over time with rising inflation since the proportional 
rate  automatically tracks changes in the retail selling price. 
In the  Commission's view,  the  specific minimum amounts,  expressed  in ecus,  should 
now be adjusted in line with inflation, so as to maintain the ratio established between the 
two components when the rates were set initially. 
The Commission proposes that the minimum rates be increased in two stages. 
The  first  stage would be to  adjust  for  inflation between  1992  (the  year in  which the 
minimum  rates  were  fixed)  and  1998  (the  year  in  which  the  rates  were  reviewed). 
According  to  Eurostat  data,  the  overall rate of inflation during this  period was  some 
18.5%. If we apply this percentage to the minimum rates and round up to the next unit, 
we obtain the following minimum rates: 
ECU 9 for cigars and cigarillos, 
ECU 24 for hand-rolling tobacco, and 
ECU 18 for other types of  smoking tobacco. 
The increased rates should take effect as of 1 January 1999. 
7 Since the Commission is proposing here that reviews be carried out at five-yearly rather 
than two-yearly intervals, a second increase in the level of rates expressed as  a specific 
amount is needed. The purpose of this second stage is to allow for the inflation forecast 
of 4.5% for the period from  1 January 1999 to 31  December 2000.  If this percentage is 
applied to the minimum rates calculated above and if the results are rounded up  to  the 
next unit, we obtain the following minimum rates: 
ECU 10 for cigars and cigarillos, 
ECU 25 for hand-rolling tobacco, and 
ECU 19 for other types of  smoking tobacco .. 
These minimum rates will take effect as of 1 January 2001. 
Point 2 
Article 4 of Directive 92/80/EEC states that the Commission must examine the rates of 
duty on cigars, cigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other types of  smoking tobacco every 
two years. 
The Commission proposes that Article 4 be amended to take account of  the change in the 
frequency of  reviews of the rates and structure of excise duties on cigarettes (see Article 
4 of Directive 92/79/EEC  and point 1 (observations concerning the  second paragraph) 
relating to Article 1 above). 
Article 3 
Article 3 amends a number of  provisions laid down iri Directive 95/59/EC on taxes other 
than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of  manufactured tobacco. 
Point 1 
Paragraph 2a is added to this Article so  as ·to  give the Member States more latitude to 
adjust the specific component of excise duty in the event of  a change in the retail selling 
price of  cigarettes in the most popular price category. 
In introducing this degree of flexibility, which is comparable to the flexibility provided 
for  in  applying the  57% rule concerning the incidence of the  overall minimum excise 
duty, the approach chosen for the taxation on cigarettes is consistent. 
The  Member States  are  authorised to  delay adjustment of excise duty to  the  required 
levels until 1 January of  the second year following that in which the retail selling price of 
cigarettes in the most popular price category was changed, and this as regards both the 
specific component of  excise duty and the incidence ofthe overall minimum excise duty. 
Point 2 
Paragraph 3 states that the Member State in question is required immediately to adjust 
the amount of specific excise duty in line with the new total tax burden on cigarettes in 
the  most  popular  price  category  only  if the  rate  of excise  duty  itself is  changed. 
Adjustments following changes in VAT are dealt with in paragraph 2a. 
8 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
amending Directive 92/79/EEC on the approximation of  taxes on cigarettes, Directive 
92/80/EEC on the approximation of  taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes 
and Directive 95/59/EC on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption 
of  manufactured tobacco 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 99 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion ofthe Economic and Social Committee, 
Whereas  in  its  first  report  on the  structure  and  rates  of excise  duties,  1  drawn  up  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Council  Directive  92179/EEC2  and  Council 
Directive 92/80/EEC,J  the  Commission  merely  drew  attention  to  certain  difficulties 
encountered in implementing the Directives without proposing any precise solutions; 
Whereas  a consultation process involving national authorities,  business  representatives 
and interest groups has since taken place; 
Whereas  the  first  stage  in  this  consultation  process  was  the  Lisbon  Conference,  the 
purpose of which was to  assess the performance of  the present Community arrangements 
and to assist the Commission in its task of planning future excise-duty policy; 
Whereas the consultation process has led to a second Commission report; 
Whereas  the  consultation  process  revealed  difficulties  in  applying  the  57%  minimum 
incidence rule; 
Whereas  the  rules  must  be  interpreted  and  implemented  more  uniformly  m  the 
Member States if the single market is to operate smoothly; 
Whereas,  moreover,  rules  which can be  implemented more  easily in  practice  must  be 
established if the single market is to operate smoothly; 
Whereas  the  Member  States  should  none  the  less  be  allowed  sufficient  flexibility  to 
identify and implement policies tailored to national circumstances; 
COM(95) 285 fmal,  13.9.85. 
2  OJ L 316,31.10.1992, p.  8. 
3  OJ L 316,31.10.1992, p.  10. Whereas,  for  practical reasons, the Member States must be allowed some flexibility to 
adjust the  incidence of the  overall minimum excise duty in  line  with certain changes, 
including those in VAT rates; 
Whereas Member States must be given the option of neutralising the impact of changes 
in the VAT rate on the overall minimum excise duty; 
Whereas the existence of this option must not lead to  distortions  of competition or to 
malfunctioning of  the single market; 
Whereas  the  options  open  to  the  Member  States  regarding  the  application  of the 
Directives must be limited over time; 
Whereas  there  is  nothing  to  prevent Member States from  being authorised to  apply  a 
minimum excise duty to  cigars, cigarillos and smoking tobacco where such an option 
already exists for cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco; 
Whereas there is a need to establish a regular review procedure; 
Whereas the present period of two years is too short for changes in the legislation of the 
Member States to be properly evaluated; 
Whereas, for this reason, reviews must take place at five-yearly intervals; 
Whereas, in order to avoid a fall  in the value of the Community minimum rates of duty 
on cigars, cigarillos and hand-rolling tobacco, a schedule of  increases is needed; 
Whereas,  therefore, Council Directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC and 95/59/EC,4  need to 
be amended, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Directive 92/79/EEC is hereby amended as follows: 
1.  A new article Article 2a is inserted: 
"Article 2a 
1.  When  a  change  in  the  retail  selling  price  of cigarettes  in  the  most  popular  price 
category  occurs  in  a  Member  State,  thereby  bringing  the  incidence  of the  overall 
minimum excise duty below the  level specified in the  first paragraph of Article 2,  the 
Member  State  in  question  may  refrain  from  adjusting  the  incidence  of the  overall 
minimum excise duty until not later than 1 January of the second year following that in 
which the change occurs. 
2. When a Member State increases the rate of  value added tax on cigarettes, it may reduce 
the  incidence of the overall minimum excise duty by an amount which, expressed as  a 
percentage of the  retail selling price, is  equal to  the increase in  the rate of value added 
4  OJ L 291, 6.12.1995, p. 40. 
10 tax, also expressed as a percentage of the retail selling price, even if such an adjustment 
has the effect of  reducing the incidence of  the overall minimum excise duty to below the 
level laid down in Article 2. 
3.  If,  in accordance with paragraph 2,  a Member State has reduced the incidence of the 
overall minimum excise duty to a level below that laid down in the first paragraph of 
Article 2,  it shall raise that incidence so  as  to  reach at  least  that  level not  later than 
1 January of  the second year after that in which the reduction took place." 
2.  Article 4 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 4 
Every five  years,  and for the first time not later than 31  December 2002, the  Council, 
acting on the basis of a report and, where appropriate, a proposal from the Commission, 
shall examine the overall minimum excise duty laid down in Article 2 and in Article 3(2) 
and the structure of  excise duties as defined by Article 16 of  Council Directive 95/59/EC 
and,  acting  unanimously  after  consulting  the  European  Parliament,  shall  adopt  the 
necessary measures. The report by the Commission and the examination by the Council 
shall  take  into  account  the  proper  functioning  of the  internal  market  and  the  wider 
objectives ofthe Treaty." 
Article 2 
Directive 92/80/EEC is hereby amended as follows: 
1.  Article 3(1) is replaced by the following: 
"1. Not later than 1 January 1993, Member States shall apply an excise duty which may 
be: 
(a) either an ad valorem duty calculated on the basis of  the maximum retail selling price 
of each product, freely determined by manufacturers established in the Community and 
by  importers  from  non-member  countries  in  accordance  with  Article  9  of Directive 
95/59/EC, 
(b) or a specific duty expressed as an amount per kilogram or for a given number of items 
in the case of  cigars and cigarillos, 
(c) or a mixture of  both, combining an ad valorem element and a specific element. 
In cases where excise duty is either ad valorem  or mixed, Member States may levy a 
minimum excise duty expressed in the same way as the excise duty referred to at (b). 
As of 1 January 1999~ the overall excise duty expressed as a percentage, as an amount per 
kilogram  or for  a  given  number of items  shall  be  at  least  equivalent  to  the  rates  or 
minimum amounts laid down for: 
cigars or cigarillos: 5% of the retail selling price inclusive of all taxes, or ECU 9 
per 1000 items or per kilogram 
fine-cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes: 30% of the retail 
selling price inclusive of  all taxes, or ECU 24 per kilogram 
11 other smoking tobaccos: 20% of the retail selling price inclusive of all taxes, or 
ECU 18 per kilogram. 
As of 1 January 2001  the amounts of ECU 9 for cigars and cigarillos, ECU 24 for fine-
cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes and ECU 18 for other smoking 
tobaccos shall be replaced by ECU 10, ECU 25 and ECU 19 respectively." 
2.  Article 4 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 4 
Every  five  years, and  for  the  first  time not  later than 31  December 2002,  the Council, 
acting on the basis of a report and, where appropriate, a proposal from the Commission, 
shall examine the rates of  duty laid down herein and, acting unanimously after consulting 
the  European  Parliament,  shall  adopt  the  necessary  measures.  The  report  by  the 
Commission  and  the  examination  by  the  Council  shall  take  into  account  the  proper 
functioning  of the  internal  market,  the  real  value of the  rates  of duty  and  the  wider 
objectives of  the Treaty." 
Article 3 
Article 16 of  Directive 95/59/EC is hereby amended as follows: 
1.  The following paragraph 2a is inserted: 
"2a.  By way of derogation  from  paragraph  2,  where,  for  instance,  due  to  a 
variation in VAT rates, a change in the retail selling. price of  cigarettes in the most 
popular price category occurs in  a Member State,  thereby bringing the  specific 
component of the excise duty, expressed as a percentage of the total tax  burden, 
below 5% or above 55% of the  total tax  burden,  the Member State in question 
may refrain from adjusting the amount of the specific excise duty until not later 
than 1 January of  the second year following that in which the change occurs." 
2.  In paragraph  3,  the  phrase "If the  excise  duty  or  the  turnover  tax  levied"  is 
replaced by  "If  the excise duty levied". 
Article 4 
1.  Member  States  shall  bring  into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 January 1999.  They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When Member States adopt these provisions, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference at the  time of their official 
publication.  The  procedure  for  such  reference  shall  be  adopted  by  Member 
States. 
2.  Member  States  shall  communicate!  to  the  Commission  the  text  of the  main 
provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 
12 Article 5 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the 
Official Journal of  the European Communities. 
Article 6 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council 
The President 
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Chapter I describes the current Community excise-duty arrangements, which entered into force on 
I January I993.  They provide for common taxation structures in the Member States and lay down 
a system of minimum rates for manufactured tobacco and harmonised procedures for the holding 
and movement of  excisable goods. 
Chapter 2 draws attention to the fact that the Directives on the approximation of excise-duty rates 
lay  down  the  obligation  to  examine  the  structure  and  rates  of such  duties.  It  refers  to  the 
Commission's first report and the Lisbon Conference ofNovember 1995, which together led to the 
current review. 
Chapter 3 examines the legislation currently in force  from  the following viewpoints: the smooth 
operation of the single market, the real value of excise-duty rates and the wider objectives of the 
Treaty. Two important aspects of  the smooth operation of  the single market are examined. Firstly, 
the relatively high taxes on tobacco and the disparities between the rates applicable in the different 
Member  States  inevitably  have  an  impact  on  fraud  and  smuggling.  Secondly,  the  practical 
application of the rules on tobacco can sometimes pose difficulties in certain Member States. It 
would therefore be a good thing to  have more flexibility in this area, without necessarily altering 
the structure of  excise duties. As regards the real value of  such duties, care must be taken to ensure 
that the minimum rates expressed as specific amounts are kept in· line with inflation. Finally, as 
regards the wider objectives of the Treaty, particular emphasis must be placed on the objective of 
health protection and the link with the price of  manufactured tobacco. 
Chapter 4 sets out the conclusions of  the review of  the structure and rates of  excise duties. I.  Community excise-duty arrangements 
1  •  GENERAL REMARKS 
1.1  Excise  duties  are  taxes  on the  consumption  of goods  such  as  cigarettes,  cigars, 
cigarillos  and  smoking  tobacco.  Excise  duty  on  tobacco  is  a  major  source  of 
revenue for the Member States, accounting for between 0.39% and 1.58% of GDP 
(see  Annex  A).  Excise-duty  rates  vary  a  great  deal  from  one  Member  State  to 
another, depending on a number of  factors such as the product's relative position on 
the market and national policies. 
1.2  The  current  arrangements  were  introduced  on  1  January  1993.  They  are  the 
outcome of discussions which started in 1985 with the White Paper on completing 
the  internal  market,  in  which  the  Commission  proposed  full  harmonisation  of 
excise duties on manufactured tobacco. However, the Council chose not to take this 
approach and harmonisation extended only to  taxation structures. Minimum rates 
were also set. 
1.3  Excisable  goods  move  between  Member  States  under  duty-suspension 
arrangements.1 Businesses wishing to  move goods under such arrangements must 
be  registered  in  the  Member State where  they are  established  and  consignments 
must  be  accompanied  by  an  administrative  document.  In  accordance  with  the 
principles  of the  single  market,  private  individuals  enjoy  greater  freedom  to 
purchase duty-paid goods in the Member State of their choice now that the limited 
travellers' allowances have been abolished. 
2.  EXCISE DUTY ON CIGARETTES 
2.1  Under  current  Community  rules2,  excise  duties  levied  on  cigarettes  by  the 
Member States must include a proportional component (calculated on the basis of 
the maximum retail selling price) and a specific component (levied on each unit of 
the product). These two components, taken together, must account for at least 57% 
of the retail selling price, including tax, of cigarettes belonging to the most popular 
price category. The specific component of excise duty must not be  lower than 5% 
or higher than 55% of the  total  tax  burden resulting  from  the  aggregation of the 
proportional  and  the  specific  excise duty  and  of the  turnover tax  levied on such 
cigarettes.  Once these two  components have been established for  this category of 
cigarettes, they are applied to cigarettes of  all price categories. 
Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25  February  1992 on the  general arrangements for products subject to  excise 
duty and on the  holding,  movement and monitoring of such products (OJ L 76,  23.3.92,  p.1),  as  amended by 
Directives 92/108/EEC of 14 December 1992 (OJ L 390, 31.12.92, p.  124) and 94/74/EC of22 December 1994 
(OJ L 365, 31.12 .94, p. 46). 
2  Council  Directive  95/59/EC  of 27  November  1995  on  taxes  other  than  turnover  taxes  which  affect  the 
consumption of manufactured tobacco (OJ L 291, 6.12.95, p. 40). 
Council  Directive  92/79/EEC  of 19  October  1992  on  the  approximation  of taxes  on cigarettes  (OJ  L  316, 
31.10.92, p. 8). 2.2  There has been much discussion over a number of  years of the ratio which should 
obtain between the proportional component and the specific component. The effect 
of ad valorem taxation is  to  increase price differences before tax. This is why ad 
valorem  taxation  has  traditionally  been  favoured  by  Member  States  which 
manufacture cigarettes using domestically produced tobacco.  Such cigarettes  are 
often produced by state monopolies and are generally cheaper than cigarettes made 
using  imported  tobacco.  Specific  taxation  is  generally  more  common  in  those 
Member States which do not cultivate tobacco. 
2.3  Article 4 of  Council Directive 92179/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation 
of taxes on cigarettes states that every two years the Council, acting on the basis of 
a report and,  where appropriate, a proposal from  the Commission, must examine 
the  overall  minimum excise  duty  and  the  structure  of excise  duties  and,  acting 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, must adopt the  necessary 
measures.  The  Commission's  report  and  the  Council's  review  must  take  into 
account the smooth functioning of  the single market and the wider objectives of  the 
Treaty. 
3.  EXCISE DUTY ON MANUFACTURED TOBACCO OTHER THAN CIGARETTES 
3 
3.1  The Community rules currently in  forceJ  relate to cigars and cigarillos,  fine-cut 
smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes, and other smoking tobacco. 
Article 3 of  Directive 92/80/EEC lays down minimum rates of  excise duty for these 
products. Member States can levy proportional excise duty, calculated on the basis 
of maximum retail selling prices,  specific  excise duty or composite excise  duty, 
subject to certain defined limits. 
3.2  The current minimum rates are as follows: 
cigars and cigarillos: 5% of the retail selling price or ECU 7 per 1000 items 
or per kilogram; 
hand-rolling  tobacco:  30%  of the  retail  selling· price  or  ECU  20  per 
kilogram. 
other  smoking  tobacco:  20%  of the  retail  selling  price  or  ECU  15  per 
kilogram. 
At all events, Member States can opt for a wholly proportional or a wholly specific 
excise duty, or a combination of  both types. 
3.3  Article 4 of  Council Directive 92/80/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation 
of taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes states that every two years, 
the Council, acting on the basis of a report and, where appropriate, a propos~l from 
the Commission, must examine the rates of  duty laid down and, acting unanimously 
after consulting the European Parliament, adopt the necessary measures. The report 
by  the  Commission  and  the  review  by  the  Council  must  take  into  account  the 
smooth functioning of the single market, the real value of the rates of duty and the 
wider objectives of  the Treaty. 
Council Directive 92/80/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco other 
than cigarettes (OJ L 316, 31.1 0.92, p.  1  0). II.  Review of structure and rates of excise duty 
1.  GENERAL REMARKS 
1.1  As stated above, the Directives on the approximation of excise rates stipulate that 
excise-duty rates  and  the  structure of excise duty  are  to  be reviewed  every two 
years. The Commission is  required to  present a report, which may or may not be 
accompanied by proposals for revising the Directives. 
2.  FIRST COMMISSION REPORT 
2.1  In 1995  the Commission presented its  first  report,  which,  in addition to  tobacco, 
dealt with alcoholic beverages and mineral oils.4 
2.2  That  review  did  not  result  in  any  proposals  for  amending  ex1stmg  legislation 
concerning excise duty on tobacco. It simply comprised an analysis of experience 
gained between  1993  and  1995  and a description of potential difficulties, but did 
not  propose  any  detailed  solutions.  The  Commission  felt  that  a  more  in-depth 
review should be conducted of the structure of excise duty on cigarettes and the 
taxation of  hand-rolling tobacco, involving consultation of  national administrations, 
business  and  interest  groups.  The  aim  was  to  facilitate  a  more  comprehensive 
analysis of all the aspects of,  and the consequences which might ensue from,  any 
changes in  the excise-duty arrangements. The Commission also sought to  monitor 
more closely the impact of the 57% rule in the Member States and to put forward 
an appropriate proposal if it should transpire that this system distorted the operation 
ofthe single market. 
2.3  On 19 September 1996 Parliament adopted its opinion on the Commission's review 
and called on the Commission to  draw up  proposals for  legislation to  resolve the 
problems identified by its 1995 review. 
3.  THE LISBON CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1995 
4 
3.1  As part of the process of  consultation of  interested parties, the Commission decided 
to hold a Conference on excise duty in Lisbon in November 1995. This was the first 
stage of  an ongoing consultation process. The Conference's aim was to evaluate the 
operation of the  Community excise-duty arrangements,  which had been in  force 
since  January  1993,  and  in  particular  to  assist  the  Commission  in  its  task  of 
plarming future excise-duty policy. The main topics dealt with were the operation 
of the  single market  in  relation  to  excisable  goods,  the  role of excise duties  in 
generating tax revenue and their possible use in other policy areas. 
3.2  It  emerged  at  the  above  Conference  that  businesses  from  the  northern 
Member States,  represented  by  the  Confederation  of  European  Community 
Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM), took a somewhat different approach to matters 
such as the interpretation of the 57% rule from that of producers from the southern 
COM(95)285 final,  13.9.95. Member States, represented by the Groupe des Industries du Tabac de  I  'Europe du 
Sud (GITES). III.  Scope of the second review 
1.  GENERAL 
1.1  The report must examine the smooth operation of the single market, the real value 
of excise-duty rates and the wider objectives of  the Treaty. 
1.2  The first review of  the structure and rates of excise duty demonstrated that a change 
in the  structure of duty on cigarettes was  not necessary to  guarantee the  smooth 
operation  of the  single  market  and  was  to  be  examined  in  the  context  of a 
consultation process.  During these consultations, neither the national  authorities 
nor  the  trade  organisations  argued  in  favour  of changing  the  existing  structure. 
Only one Member State considered that the range of between 5% and 55% for the 
specific component of  excise duty should be widened. 
1.3  Accordingly,  the  Commission  does  not  consider  it  appropriate  to  propose 
amendments to  the structure or rates of excise duty.  It  thus  suggests only a few 
technical adjustments to existing legislation. 
2.  OPERATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
2.1  The  movement  system  for  intra-Community  transactions  makes  it  possible  to 
maintain  i'n  force  a  system  whereby  tax  is  levied  by  the  Member  State  of 
destination,  this  being compatible with the  abolition of border controls.  On the 
whole,  this  system  seems  to  work  fairly  well  where  lawful  trade  is  concerned, 
despite the fact that substantial differences still exist in the rates of  duty applied by 
Member States. 
2.2  It is  more difficult, on the other hand,  to  quantify the effect which the  persistent 
disparity in rates could have on fraud in this sector. There is evidence that fraud has 
increased in the tobacco sector in recent years.  There is also evidence to  suggest 
that it is  largely perpetrated by organised criminal gangs who are also involved in 
other  criminal  activities.  These  gangs  operate  wherever  they  can  make  the 
maximum profit at minimum risk to themselves, and the Community's tax systems 
have become a prime target. Their profits derive from the very high taxes levied on 
tobacco relative to its underlying value and, in some cases, from the fact  that there 
are  significant  differences  in  rates  of  excise  duty  between  Member  States. 
Increasing  rates  of duty  on  tobacco  would  give  such  gangs  an  even  greater 
incentive to introduce these products into fraud rings. 
2.3  The  significant differences  in  retail  selling  prices  (which derive  largely,  but not 
exclusively,  from  the  substantial  differences  in  rates  of  duty  between 
Member States) encourage people to buy the products concerned in Member States 
where duty is low and to transport them to Member States where duty is higher.  As 
long as this is done by individuals for their own personal needs, the operation of  the 
single market is  not affected.  When  border crossings become more frequent and 
the  quantities  transported  greatly  exceed  the  purchasers'  own needs,  contraband 
causes serious competition problems. 
2.4  In March 1996 a High-Level Group was set up to examine the nature and extent of 
fraud  and  the  weaknesses of the  systems  and  legislation  in  force,  and  to  make 
21 recommendations  to  the  Directors-General of Indirect Taxation and  Customs  on 
how to combat fraud more effectively.  This Group identified the following as the 
principal  sources  of  fraud:  failure  to  comply  with  legislation  and  to  fulfil 
obligations,  inadequate  cooperation  between  Member  States,  lack  of modem 
information  technology  and  infrequent  controls.  Large-scale  fraud  is  targeted 
mainly at  the markets of Member States with the highest rates of excise duty.  In 
addition,  differences  in  rates  of duty between Member States cause a growth in 
contraband  involving  duty-paid  products.  The  Group  has  drawn  up  a  list  of 
recommendations to  address the shortcomings discovered during their discussions. 
The Commission will  work closely with the  Member States  to  implement these 
recommendations  and  will  make  proposals  if  necessary.  The  principal 
recommendations  concern  the  introduction  of a  computerised  movement  and 
control  system  for  the  Community excise  system,  the  introduction of an  excise 
early  warning  system  for  products  liable  to  excise  duty,  improvements  in  the 
gathering and use of intelligence to  increase the effectiveness of physical controls, 
the establishment of a code of  best practice for licensing warehousekeepers and the 
negotiation of  Memoranda ofUnderstanding with producers and the trade. 
2.5  Rates  of duty  thus  provide  an  incentive  to  commit  fraud.  Even  complete 
harmonisation  of rates  could  not  prevent  the  growth  of illegal  activities  since 
harmonisation would necessarily mean aligning rates on the highest national rates 
within the Union. 
A.  Cigarettes 
2.6  The rates of duty applied by Member States to  cigarettes are  shown in Annex B. 
The  way  in  which  the  overall  minimum  rate  of excise  duty  is  expressed  (as  a 
percentage of the retail  selling price) can give a misleading impression about the 
degree of approximation of rates  of duty.  The  levels  applied by Member States 
vary between 57% and  66.68% but,  in absolute terms, the  Member State levying 
the highest tax  appl~es a rate four times higher than the Member State levying the 
lowest tax.  Sweden, which is temporarily (until 31  December 1998) exempt from 
applying  the  57%  rule,  is  currently  close  to  that  rate.  Despite  the  exemption, 
however,  Sweden  applies  the  fifth-highest  rate  of tax  in  absolute  terms  in  the 
Community.  This means that, even if every Member State were to  set the overall 
minimum  rate  of excise duty  at  57%  of the  retail  selling price (or  at  any  other 
standard  percentage),  the  differences  in  taxation  and  in  retail  selling  prices  in 
absolute terms would persist.  This is  the result of the  following  factors:  pre-tax 
prices,  the  most  popular price  category,  the  combination of the  specific  and  ad 
valorem components, and VAT rates. 
2. 7  Despite these differences,  no  requests  for  greater convergence were made  during 
the  consultation process.  In  particular,  the  trade  organisations saw no  need  for 
greater harmonisation of excise-duty rates.  It was generally agreed, however, that 
the  teclmical  problems  which  had  become  evident  when  the  existi~ rules  were 
implemented would have to be resolved. 
2.8  The retail selling price of cigarettes comprises several components, such as  the ex 
works price, distributors' margins, excise duty (specific and ad valorem) and VAT. 
Since the incidence of  overall minimum excise duty is calculated as a percentage of 
the  final  retail  selling price  for  cigarettes  in  the  most popular price  category,  it 
follows  that  a  change  in  any  one  of these  components  would  affect  the  ratio 
between the overall excise duty and the retail selling price. 2.9  This is very important in Member States where the level of  excise duty is around or 
just above  the  minimum  rate  of 57%.  An increase  in  the  ex  works  price,  for 
example,  can  cause  the  overall  excise  duty  to  fall  below  the  57%  minimum, 
obliging the  Member State concerned to  raise  its  rate of excise duty  in  order to 
attain the 57% limit again. 
2.10  Several Member States which levy high taxes on cigarettes are, however, at or just 
above the 57% threshold.  The existing rules therefore have the perverse effect of 
forcing up excise duties in countries with already high tax burdens, which is clearly 
at  odds with the overall commitment to  approximate rates.  In the  long  run,  the 
differences  in  tax  burdens  (measured  in  money  terms)  in  the Community could 
increase  further,  and  this  in  tum would  lead  to  greater tax-driven  differences  in 
retail selling prices.  Such an effect would obviously not be  in  the interests of the 
single market. 
2.11  This problem was raised in the first report on excise duties and was also examined 
during  the  consultation process.  The  problem  arises  where  there  is  an  increase 
either in  a pre-tax  price  component  (cost  of labour,  materials,  etc.)  or in  VAT. 
Because of the nature of taxation on cigarettes, a pre-tax price increase of one unit 
results in a retail selling-price increase of more than one unit.  There is, therefore, a 
multiplier  effect.  The  greater  the  ad valorem  tax,  the  higher  the  multiplier 
coefficient.  Conversely, in Member States which apply mainly specific duty,  the 
multiplier coefficients are  lower.  If only one specific excise duty is  applied,  any 
changes in the pre-tax price will affect only the rate of  VAT. 
2.12  The difficulties in applying the 57% rule are particularly severe when the  level of 
taxation in a Member State is  very close to  57% and the  VAT rate  is  increased. 
This triggers  a rise in  the overall level of taxation which may not necessarily be 
what the Member State concerned wished. 
2.13  The rate of excise duty comprises a component which is expressed as a percentage 
of the retail selling price of  the goods, inclusive ofVAT.  In addition, VAT itself is 
applied to  the  value of the  goods,  inclusive of excise duty.  Accordingly, a mere 
increase in the rate of VAT will lead to  an  increase in the burden of excise duty in 
absolute terms, which in tum will increase the base for  calculating the  new VAT 
rate.  Furthermore, because of the change in the relative proportions of the different 
components of the retail selling price, overall excise duty will no longer amount to 
57% of  the retail selling price.  It will, therefore, be necessary to introduce a further 
increase  in  excise  duty  which  will  in  tum result  in  an  increase  in  the  base  for 
calculating the  new VAT rate,  and  so  on.  This process is  known in  the  tobacco 
industry as the "cascade effect". 
2.14  In no  other sector is  the impact of an  increase in the rate of VAT so  great.  The 
industry argues that  governments may pursue the  tax policies of their choice but 
that they should not be forced  to  adjust their excise duties upwards without good 
reason and without having actually decided to do so. 
2.15  A  related  question  has  emerged  since  the  Lisbon  Conference.  It concerns  the 
manner in which the 57% rule is applied in the Member States.  This question was 
also raised at the meetings of the Excise Committee held in March and June 1996. 
It was noted at these meetings that Member States interpret the minimum incidence 
of  57% in two different ways. 
z.s 2.16  Some  Member  States  and  the  Commission  departments  thought  it  necessary  to 
. follow  Article  2  of Directive 92179/EEC  to  the  letter.  Checks  on  whether  the 
minimum incidence of 57% has been attained are not limited to  1 January and need 
not  be  carried  out  only  once  a  year.  There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  constant 
obligation to  comply with the 57% minimum every time a change occurs in retail 
selling  prices,  while  respecting  the  most  popular  price  category,  which  is 
established  only  once  a  year.  Other  Member  States  disagreed  with  this 
interpretation and maintained that a check on the 57% minimum need be carried out 
only once a year.  Some Member States agreed with the strict interpretation but 
said that they checked the incidence of  excise duty only once a year. 
2.17  In practice, it would seem that continuous checking is difficult to carry out and does 
not even constitute the best approach.  Moreover, other interpretations exist which 
are  equally valid but are not entirely consistent with a strict interpretation.  It is, 
however, difficult to  authorise indefinitely a situation in which there are different 
practices  based  on  differing  legal  interpretations.  A  possible  course  of action 
would  be  to  initiate  infringement  proceedings  against  Member  States  whose 
interpretation  is  not  strictly  correct.  In  so  far  as  those  Member  States' 
interpretation  is  influenced by  what  they  consider to  be practicable,  it might  be 
preferable  to  make a technical  amendment to  Community legislation.  The aim 
would be to  authorise what is  practised by the  Member States and to  grant some 
leeway to  those Member States which have adhered to  a strict interpretation of the 
law;  the  essential  role  of the  existing  rules  would  not,  however,  be  called  into 
question. 
2.18  In addition, since the Lisbon Conference and as part of  the consultation process, the 
two  bodies representing the industry (CECCM and GITES) have held discussions 
to  try and agree on a common approach to  any  amendment to  the  existing rules. 
There have also been many contacts with the Commission departments. 
2.19  In order to incorporate this greater flexibility into Article 2 of  Directive 92179/EEC, 
the Commission concluded that, where a change occurred in the retail selling prices 
of  cigarettes in the most popular price category or where VAT was increased, it was 
necessary to authorise Member States to refrain from adjusting the incidence of the 
overall  minimum  excise  duty  until  1  January  at  the  latest  of the  second  year 
following that in which the change took place. 
2.20  In  order to  guarantee a consistent approach,  similar flexibility  would have  to  be 
granted  in  respect  of adjustments  to  the  specific  component  of excise  duty. 
According to Article 16(2) of  Directive 95/59/EC, specific excise duty on cigarettes 
may not be less than 5% or more than 55% of the amount of the total tax  burden 
resulting from  the aggregation of the proportional excise duty, the specific excise 
duty and the turnover tax  levied on cigarettes in  the most popular price category. 
The  Commission  concluded  that  it  was  necessary  to  amend  Article  16  and  to 
authorise Member States, in  the  event of excise duty falling  below 5%  or rising 
above 55% as a result of changes in the retail selling price of cigarettes in the most 
popular  price  category,  to  refrain  from  adjusting  the  incidence  of the  overall 
minimum excise duty until not later than  1 January of the second year following 
that in which the change took place. 
B.  Other manufactured tobacco 2.21  The rates of  excise duty levied by Member States on cigars, cigarillos, hand-rolling 
tobacco and other smoking tobacco are given in Annex C.  The first review of  rates 
had shown that the taxation of  cigars, cigarillos and other smoking tobacco did not 
give rise to  any particular problems.  Markets in these products show a significant 
drop in consumption. 
2.22  However, where hand-rolling tobacco is concerned,  the substantial differences  in 
tax  levels  among  Member  States,  combined  with  major  differences  in  pre-tax 
prices, encourage smuggling between neighbouring countries.  Large quantities of 
hand-rolling  tobacco  are  purchased  in  Member States  where  taxation  is  lowest. 
These products are  then resold illegally on the markets of Member States with a 
high tax rate (particularly the United Kingdom and Ireland).  It would seem at first 
sight  that  it  concerns  a problem  to  be  resolved  by  Member States  who  have  to 
approximate their national rates and/or tighten up  their control measures.  On  the 
other  hand,  an  increase  in  minimum  rates  would  be  unacceptable  to  most 
Member States and to the tobacco industry, and would seriously upset the balance 
between  the  consumption  of cigarettes  and  the  consumption  of hand-rolling 
tobacco. 
2.23  The  manner  in which  the  rules  for  taxing  cigars  and  hand-rolling  tobacco  are 
applied were the subject of a recent investigation.  Directive 92/80/EEC stipulates 
that Member States must apply to cigars, cigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other 
smoking tobacco an excise duty that is either ad valorem or specific, or a mixture 
of the  two.  In addition,  Member States  may  levy a  minimum  excise  duty  on 
hand-rolling tobacco (as on cigarettes), provided that this does not have the effect 
of raising the total tax to more than 90% of the total tax on the most popular price 
category of  hand-rolling tobacco. 
2.24  However,  in  at  least  one  Member  State,  the  rules  have  been  interpreted  as  an 
authorisation to apply ad valorem rates to  cigars and smoking tobacco, subject to 
fixed specific minimum levels.  The Commission considers that this interpretation 
does not comply strictly with the Directive and has decided to initiate infringement 
proceedings. 
2.25  Although there is an infringement at a technical level, the approach adopted by this 
Member State has no detrimental effects.  There have been no complaints about this 
practice.  A number of Member States consider that it may even have some merits 
and  they  would  be  interested  in  introducing  similar  measures  to  their  own 
legislation if Community law so permitted.  The effect of  this measure is to increase 
the  relative  incidence  of tax  on  the  cheapest  products.  The  European  Cigar 
Manufacturers  Association  recently  pointed  out  that  the  cheapest  cigars  do  not 
compete with  the  most expensive.  Competition actually comes  from  cigarette-
style products which apparently comply with the definition of cigars and cigarillos, 
thereby  benefiting  from  much  lower  tax  levels.  The  cigar industry  fears  that, 
unless  this development is  stopped or at  least  kept  in  check,  Member States will 
react by increasing overall levels of  taxation, thereby penalising the traditional cigar 
industry. 
2.26  The fact that the approach adopted by a Member State is illegal for cigars but quite 
legal  for  cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco makes  it  more difficult to  defend or 
justify the arrangements laid down by the Directive for cigars and smoking tobacco. 
The  Commission,  therefore,  concluded  that  it  was  necessary  to  allow  Member States to  levy a minimum excise duty on cigars and smoking tobacco too.  Such a 
measure should not give rise to much opposition. 
3.  REAL VALUE OF EXCISE DUTY 
3.1  The review must also cover the real value of  excise duty.  Account must, therefore, 
be taken of the actual rate adjustments made by Member States and to establish to 
what  extent  inflation  is  reflected  in  these  adjustments.  Normally,  national 
authorities take account of  inflation in drawing up their budget.  It may be assumed 
that, in general, all other things being equal, these authorities raise excise duties in 
line with inflation. 
A.  Cigarettes 
3.2  The minimum rate of excise duty on cigarettes is set at  57% of the retail selling 
price (inclusive of all taxes) of  cigarettes in the most popular price category in each 
Member State, on the basis of  data established at  1 January of each year.  The fact 
that this minimum rate is expressed as a percentage of  the retail selling price means 
that  it  automatically  takes  account  of inflation  and  that  no  such  adjustment  is 
therefore needed. 
B.  Other manufactured tobacco 
3.3  As  indicated  at  point  3.2  of Chapter I,  the  minimum rates  applicable  to  cigars, 
cigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other smoking tobacco are expressed both as a 
percentage  of the  retail  selling  price  and  as  a  specific  amount.  All  other 
considerations  aside,  it  should be  noted that,  over time and with rising inflation, 
there  will  be  a  gap  between  these  two  factors,  with  the  ad  valorem  rate 
automatically tracking changes in retail selling prices. 
3.4  Where  actual  rate  movements  are  concerned,  most  Member  States  apply  rates 
which rely mainly, if not exclusively, on an ad valorem component, ensuring that 
inflation is more or less  automatically taken into  account.  Furthermore, Member 
States which apply specific taxation have tended to  adjust their duty levels in this 
respect. 
3.5  It is necessary to adjust in line with inflation minimum rates expressed as a specific 
amount  in  order to  maintain  the  ratio  fixed  when  the  rates  were  first  set.  The 
Commission considers that it  would be desirable  at  present to  bring  the  specific 
minimum rates expressed in ecus into line with inflation. 
3.6  Details of  national consumer-price indices, as well as the average for the European 
Union, are given in Annex D.  According to  the consumer price indices drawn up 
by Eurostat, the rate of inflation was 4.1% in  1993,  3.2% in 1994, 3.0% in  1995, 
2.6% in  1996 and 2.1% in  1997.  For 1998 Eurostat forecasts a rate of2.2%.  The 
inflation rate  for  the  period  from  1992  (when  minimum  rates  were  set)  to  1998 
(when rates are  to  be  reviewed) may therefore be  estimated at  some  18.5%.  By 
applying this  percentage to  existing minimum rates  and  after rounding  up  to  the 
nearest unit, the following minimum rates are arrived at: 
ECU 9 for cigars and cigarillos; 
- ECU 24 for hand-rolling tobacco; 
26 - ECU 18 for other smoking tobacco. 
3.7  In  its  proposal  amending  Directive  92/80/EEC,  the  Commission  will,  therefore, 
suggest  replacing  the  existing  amounts  with  the  above  amounts  from 
I January 1999. 
4.  WIDER OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY 
4.1  Given the  criteria  laid  down  for  achieving  economic  and  monetary union,  it  is 
essential that Community excise-duty policy, while aimed primarily at ensuring the 
smooth operation of  the single market, should, on the one hand, guarantee sufficient 
revenue  receipts  and  sound  conditions  at  national  level  and,  on  the  other,  be 
consistent  with  the  wider  policies  of the  European  Union.  It  is  clear  that 
reconciling the various Treaty objectives with improvements in the functioning of 
the single market raises potentially difficult issues which cannot always be easily 
resolved. Where manufactured tobacco products are concerned, particular attention 
must be paid to the health-protection aspects and to the relationship between such 
protection and the price of  these products. 
4.2  Every  year  hundreds  of thousands  of people  in  the  European  Union  die  of 
tobacco-related diseases.  These diseases also add considerably to health-care costs. 
Taxation of  tobacco products is an obvious means not only of  discouraging tobacco 
consumption but also of  funding the resulting health-care costs. 
4.3  Tobacco is at present very heavily taxed in most Member States.  This is justified 
on public-health grounds since it helps discourage consumption.  High prices are 
particularly effective in discouraging young people from consuming tobacco since 
their resources  are often limited.  However,  a policy of high tobacco  taxes  has 
limited effects for a number of  reasons.  In particular, such a policy does not affect 
smokers' dependence on nicotine.  For it to  have a preventive effect and act as  a 
convincing  disincentive,  it  should  be  accompanied  by  measures  to  help  wean 
consumers  off  tobacco,  to  reduce  tobacco  advertising  and  to  promote 
health-education and information campaigns. 
4.4  During the consultation process, health-protection pressure groups argued in favour 
of higher tobacco taxes in general and of an approximation of rates on cigarettes 
and hand-rolling tobacco.  They pointed out that hand-rolling tobacco is just as 
harmful as- or even more hannful than- cigarettes and that its low price makes it 
attractive to  young people.  Hand-rolling tobacco  carries a particular health risk 
since cigarettes produced in this way do not contain standard doses, since there is 
not normally a filter and since no information is provided on tar levels and nicotine 
content.  Moreover,  lower  taxation  makes  this  product  particularly  attractive  to 
young people.  The arguments of the health-protection pressure groups are largely 
supported by the  Commission.  Their claims have though been disputed by the 
hand-rolling tobacco industry, represented by ESTA (European Smoking Tobacco 
Association),  which  emphasises  that  the  product  is  consumed  mainly  by  older 
smokers.  This  Association stresses  that  its  industry  is  less  automated  than  the 
cigarette  indu~try and  is,  therefore,  more  labour-intensive.  The lower  tax  rates 
compared with cigarettes are necessary in order to safeguard its survival.  Lastly, it 
points  out  that  its  product  has  very  limited  market  shares  in  relation  to  other 
tobacco-based products and that sales are concentrated for the most part in three 
Member States. 4.5  The public-health objective of  reducing consumption through high taxation will fall 
short of its  target if tobacco  products  evade this  taxation.  Moreover, if tobacco 
products  avoid  the  normal  marketing  channels  (with  tax  being  paid  in  the 
Member State where it is  actually due),  they may also avoid other rules, such as 
those restricting sales to  minors, those regarding tar levels  and nicotine  content, 
additives, labelling, etc.  This factor must be taken into account when a tax increase 
is being considered.  Consumers who do not have the financial resources to obtain 
tobacco  legally but cannot  do  without  it  are  tempted  to  obtain  it  on  the  black 
market.  In some cases, these products, when sold illegally, do  not offer the same 
quality and health guarantees because they are not subject to health controls.  Illegal 
imports sold at prices below domestic prices may also encourage young people to 
smoke and influence their consumption habits.  Such consumer behaviour, which 
is linked to fairly high taxation, therefore clearly has adverse effects on hygiene and 
health. 
4.6  Maximum  retail  selling  prices  for  different  types  of tobacco  are  freely  set  by 
manufacturers  or,  where  appropriate,  their  representatives  or  agents  within  the 
Community and by importers releasing goods from  third countries for home use in 
the  individual  Member  States.  Governments  are  free  to  set  excise-duty  levels 
nationally  provided  that  they  comply  with  the  minimum  levels  laid  down  in 
Directives 92179/EEC  and  92/80/EEC.  Subject  to  this  proviso,  therefore,  it  is 
largely up  to  the Member States to  decide on the level of duty they apply and to 
take account of  such factors as health and fraud. 
5.  FREQUENCY OF REVIEWS 
5.1  Both Article 4 of Directive 92179/EEC on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes 
and  Article  4  of  Directive  92/80/EEC  on  the  approximation  of  taxes  on 
manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes stipulate that the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, will examine the structure and rates of  excise duty. 
5.2  The Commission takes the view that a two-year period is too short to  provide the 
proper perspective for assessing changes in Member States' legislation.  A five-year 
period would be more appropriate for assessing the operation of the single market 
and the influences of  any changes in legislation. 
5.3  For that reason, the Commission has  concluded that Article 4 of both Directives 
should be  amended and that the  review should take place every five  years rather 
than every two years.  It is, of  course, free to make proposals before the end of  this 
five-year period where it deems this to be necessary or where account needs to be 
taken of changes on the tobacco market.  However, in order to take account of the 
need to raise the level of  rates expressed as a specific amount, it intends to propose 
a two-stage increase in minimum rates. 
5.4  The  first  stage,  which  involves  adjusting  the  minimum  rates  applicable  for  the 
period 1992-98,  is  described  at  point 3. 7 above.  This increase should enter into 
force on 1 January  1999.  The second stage is designed to take account ofthe rate 
of inflation for the period between 1 January 1999 and 31  December 2000.  On the 
basis of Eurostat data, the rate of inflation can be put at around 2.2% a year or at 
4.5% for the period as a whole. By applying this percentage to the minimum rates 
calculated above and after rounding up  to the nearest unit, the following minimum 
rates are arrived at: ECU 10 for cigars and cigarillos; 
ECU 25 for hand-rolling tobacco; 
ECU 19 for other smoking tobacco. 
The  Commission  will  propose  that  these  minimum  rates  enter  into  force  on 
1 January 2001. 
5.5  The Commission will incorporate this timetable for raising the minimum rates for 
cigars, tigarillos, hand-rolling tobacco and other smoking tobacco into its proposal 
amending Directive 92/80/EEC. IV. Conclusions 
1.1  This review of  the structure and rates of  excise duty on tobacco leads to the conclusion that 
only a few  technical amendments to  existing Community legislation are necessary.  The 
technical amendments envisaged have  been agreed upon by the  entire tobacco  industry 
unlike  in  the  past,  when  bodies  representing  multinationals  and  monopolies  have 
traditionally held opposing views.  After consulting the trade organisations and bearing in 
mind  that  the  previous  review  was  fairly  recent,  the  Commission  concluded  that  the 
structures and rates of  excise duty could remain unchanged. 
1.2  Where cigarettes are concerned, the Commission concluded that Member States should be 
given greater leeway for adjusting the incidence of the overall minimum duty in the event 
of a change either in the retail selling price of  cigarettes in the most popular price category 
or in value added tax.  Similar leeway should be granted for adjustments to the specific 
component of excise duty when this component is expressed as  a percentage of the retail 
selling price. 
1.3  The Commission concluded that Article  16 of Directive 95/59/EC should be amended in 
order to  enable Member States to  levy a minimum excise duty on cigars, cigarillos and 
smoking tobacco. 
1.4  The specific minimum amounts for  tobacco other than cigarettes should be brought into 
line with inflation. 
1.5  It would appear more appropriate to review the structure and rates of excise duty at five-
yearly rather than two-yearly intervals. 
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REVENUE FROM EXCISE DUTY ON  MANUFACTURED TOBACCO AS  A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1996) 
Revenue  from  GDP  Excise revenue 
excise duty (ECU  (ECU billion)  (%ofGDP) 
million) 
Belgium  1 088 76  211.3  0.52% 
Denmark  993.16  137.80  0.72% 
Germany  10 757.60  1854.60  0.58% 
Greece  1330.66  96.50  1.38% 
Spain  2759.02  457.80  0.60% 
France  6259.57  1 210.60  0.52% 
Ireland  643.99  55.7  1.16% 
Italy  5031.99  956.40  0.53% 
Luxembourg  212.63  13.50  1.58% 
Ndherlands  1 398.81  312.00  0.45% 
Austria  929.64  180.30  0.52% 
Portugal  842.13  81.70  1.03% 
Finland  521.49  98.60  0.53% 
Sweden  776.10  197.10  0.39% 





Manuf~actured tobacco  Situ:uion  as at  1.6.97 
Cigarettes 
Specific ncise duty (1000 items)  Ad valorem  "le VAT  Ad  valorem  Total  Current  price  of  I  000  Totaltu  Overall 
euisr duty  ncist duty  s~cific tu  cigarelles  in  the  most  burden  mi•imum 
+VAT  +  Ad.VMI+  popular price category.  excise duly 
'  VAT 
RJ'IAT; retail  selling  price  incl.  Nat. currency  ecu  (as  %  of  (as  a  %  of  (as  %  of  (as  %  of  (as  %  of  (as  %  of  National  in ecus  (reus  per  specific 
all W•c:s  retail  selling  aggregate  retail  selling  retail  selling  retail  selling  retail  selling  currency  1000  excise duty + 
price)  specific  and  price)  price)  price)  price)  cigarcues)  ad  va/ore111 
ad  valore111  excise  duty, 
t:lx +VAT)  exclusive  of 
VAT 
(RPIAT) 
(RI'IAT)  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT) 
Minimum rate of  excise duty  57% of retail 
adopted by the Council on  selling  price 
19.10. 92  (incl. all 
taxes) 
MS  Nat. curr. 
AT  OS  246.00  18.22  15.38%  20.77%  42.00%  16.67%  58.67%  74.04%  1600.00  118.53  87.76  57.38o/o 
BE  BFR  357.00  9.04  6.97%  9.38%  50.00%  17.36%  67.36%  74.33%  5120.00  129.61  96.33  56.97% 
DE  OM  83.00  43.25  32.52%  46.21%  24.80%  13.04%  37.84%  70.36%  255.26  133.02  93.59  57.32% 
DK  OKR  606.80  82.40  41.14%  49.95%  21.22%  20.00%  41.22%  82.36%  1475.00  200.29  164.96  62.36% 
EL  ORA  1000.31  3.30  3.64%  5.000/o  53.86%  15.25%  69.11%  72.75%  27500  90.70  65.99  57.50% 
ES  PTA  500.00  3.09  5.88%  7.98%  54.00%  13.79%  67.79%  73.68%  8500  52.61  38.76  59.88% 
Fl  FMK  90.00  15.67  8.37%  10.96%  50.00%  18.03%  68.03%  76.40%  1075.00  187.19  143.02  58.37% 
FR  FF  36.67  5.65  3.80%  5.04%  54.50%  17.08%  71.58%  75.38%  965.00  148.60  112.01  58.30o/. 
GB  UKL  65.97  81.98  42.84%  54.41%  21.00%  14.89%  35.89o/.  78.73%  154.00  191.38  150.67  63.84% 
IE  IRL  62.64  79.74  42.47%  55.33%  16.93°/e  17.36%  34.29%  76.75%  147.50  187.78  144.12  59.40% 
IT  LIT  6384.56  3.33  3.65%  .  5.00%  53.35%  15.97%  69.32%  72.96%  175000  91.35  66.66  57.00% 
LU  LFR  127.00  3.21  3.45%  5.03%  54.50%  10.71%  65.21%  68.67%  3680  93.15  63.96  57.95% 
NL  HFL  82.70  38.43  35.96%  50.02%  21.04%  14.89%  35.93%  71.89%  230.00  106.87  76.83  57.00% 
PT  ESC  1452.00  7.44  9.68%  11.61%  57.00%  16.67%  73.67%  83.35%  15000.00  76.87  64.07  66.68% 
SE  SKR  660.00  79.10  36.16%  49.84%  16.40o/.  20.00%  36.40%  72.56o/.  1825.00  218.72  158.72  52.56% 
PT:  A reduced rate of up to 50%  less may be applied to cigarettes consumed in the most remote regions of  the Azores and Madeira and made by small-scale manufacturers each of 
whose yearly output does not exceed 500 tonnes (Directive 92n9!EEC, Art.3(2)). vJ 
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Annex C.l 
Cigars and cigarillos 
Manufactured tobacco  Situation  on  1.6.97 
Cigars and cigarillos 
RPIAT  =  Spuilic ncise duly  Ad  1'11/orem  e;. VAT  Ad  "1'11/Drem  Overo~ll minimum excise duty expressed 
retail  5t:lling  nciseduly  ncise  duly  as  e;.  or as  an  amount per kilogram or 
price  incl.  +VAT  per 1000 items 
All taxes 
Nat. currency  ecu  (as  %  of  (as  %  of  (as  %  of  5% of  retail selling price, incl  All  taxes 
retail  selling  retail  selling  retail  selling 
price)  price)  price)  ECU 7 per 1000 items or per kilogram 
Minimum rate of  excise duly 
adopted by lhc Council on  (Art. 3  of Directive 92/80) 
19.10.92  lRPIATl  lRPIATl  CRPIATI 
MS  Nat. currency 
AT  OS  0.00  0.00  13.00%  16.67%  29.67o/o 
BE  BFR  0.00  0.00  10.00%  17.36%  27.36% 
DE  DM  0.00  0.00  5.00%  13.04%  18.WW. 
DK  DKR  198.00  26.89  10.00%  20.00%  30.00% 
EL  DRA  0.00  0.00  26.00%  15.25%  41.25% 
ES  PTA  0.00  0.00  12.50%  13.79%  26.29"/o 
Fl  FMK  0.00  0.00  22.00%  18.03%  40.03% 
FR  FF  0.00  0.00  28.86%  17.08%  45.94% 
GB  UKL  .  98.02  121.81  0.00%  14.89%  14.89% 
IE  IRL  94.65  120.50  0.00%  17.36%  17.36% 
IT  LIT  0.00  0.00  23.00%  15.97%  38.97% 
IT  LIT  0.00  0.00  46.00%  15.97%  61.97% 
LU  LFR  0.00  0.00  10.00%  10.71%  20.71% 
NL  HFL  0.00  0.00  5.00%  14.89%  19.89% 
PT  ESC  0.00  0.00  26.21%  16.67%  42.88% 
SE  SKR  440.00  52.73  0.00%  20.00%  20.00% 
General remark:  The rates or amounts are effective for all products belonging to the group of  manufactured tobaccos concerned, without distinction within each group as to 
quality, presentation, origin of the products, the materials used, the characteristics of the lim1s involved or any other criterion (Directive 92/80/EEC, 
Article 3(2)). 
ES and IT:  These two countries may, until 31  December 1998, apply to rolls of  tobacco consisting entirely of  natural tobacco which are not cigarettes a rate or amount which 
may be up to 50% less than the nom1al national rate of  excise duty for cigars and cigarillos and which may fall below the minimum rate (Directive 92/80/EEC, 
Article 3(3)). (~ 
6) 
AnnexeC.2 
Fine-cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes 
Manufactured tobacco  Situation as at 1.6.97 
RPIAT=  I  Specific ncisr duty 
retail  sc:lling  as % or as :in amount per kilogr.am 
price incl. a  II 
taxes 
(as  %  of  (as  %  of  (as  %  of j30% of  retail selling price, incl. all taxes 
retail  selling  retail  selling  retail  selling 
Minimum excise duty Me:  Nat. currency  ecu  price)  price)  price:)  I  ECU 20 per kilogram 
adopted by the Council on  (An. 3 of Directive 92180) 
19.10.92  .  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT) 
MS  Nat. currency 
AT  OS  0.00  0.00  47.oo-/.  16.67%  63.67% 
BE  BFR  0.00  0.00  37.55%  17.36%  54.91% 
DE  DM  30.21  15.74  18.12%  13.04%  31.16% 
DK  DKR  400.00  54.32  o.oo-1.  2o.oo•;.  20.000/o 
EL  DRA  0.00  0.00  59.00~.  15.25%  74.25% 
ES  PTA  0.00  0.00  37.50%  13.7901.  51.29% 
FJ  FMK  12.00  2.09  48.00%  18.03%  66.0Jo/o 
FR  FF  0.00  0.00  51.00%  17.08%  68.08% 
GB  UKL  87.74  109.03  o.oo-;.  14.89%  14.89% 
IE  JRL  79.87  101.68  o.oo-;.  17.36%  17.36% 
IT  LIT  0.00  0.00  54.0001.  15.97%  69.97% 
LU  LFR  0.00  0.00  31.5001.  10.71%  42.21% 
NL  HFL  36.10  16.77  15.72%  14.8901.  30.61% 
PT  ESC  0.00  0.00  30.0001.  16.61%  46.67% 
SE  SKR  394.00  47.22  0.0001.  20.0001.  20.00% 
General remark:  The rates or amounts are effective for all products belonging to the group of  manufactured tobaccos concerned, without distinction within each group as to 
quality, presentation, origin of  the products, the materials used, the characteristics of  the firms involved or any other criterion (Directive 92/80/EEC,  Article 3(2)). w 
...J) 
Other smoking tobacco 
Manufaacturcd tobacco 
Other smokin1 tobacco 
KI'IAT  =  Specific: uc:isc: duly ralc:  A.IINMtnl  %VAT  All ...... 
retail  scllin&  uc:i~e lllul)'  nc:ilelllul)' 
price incl. all  +VAT 
Ill  xes 
(u  a  %  of  (u  a  %  of  (u  a  %  of 
n:llil  sellins  n:lli  I  sell ins  n:tai I  sellins 
price)  price)  price) 
M  inin1um r.uc: uf  excise duly  National  ec:u 
adopted  by the Council on  C:UITCRC)' 
19.10.92  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT)  (RPIAT) 
MS  Nat. currency 
AT  OS  0.00  0.00  3-4.00%  16.67%  S0.67% 
BE  DFR  0.00  0.00  37.SS%  17.36%  S-4.91% 
DE  OM  s.so  2.87  22.00%  13.0-4%  3S.O.C% 
OK  DKR  350.00  -47.53  20.00% 
EL  ORA  0.00  0.00  S9.00%  IS.2S%  7-4.25% 
ES  PTA  0.00  0.00  22.50%  13.79%  36.29% 
fl  FMK  12.00  2.0')  48.00%  J8.0l%  66.03% 
FR  FF  0.00  0.00  46)4%  17.08%  63.82% 
GO  UKL  43.10  Sl.S6  0.00%  14.89%  14.89% 
IE  IRL  6S.67  83.60  0.00%  17.36%  11.36% 
IT.  LIT  0.00  0.00  5-4.00%  IS.97%  69.97% 
LU  LFR  0.00  0.00  31.50%  10.71%  42.21% 
NL  HFL  36.10  16.77  IS.72%  14.89%  30.61% 
PT  ESC  0.00  0.00  30.00%  16.67%  46.67% 
SE  SKR  7S.OO  8.99  0.00%  20.00%  20.CW.4 
SE  SKR  o489.00  58.61  0.00%  20.CW.4  20.00% 
Annex C.l 
Situation  as at 1.6.97 
Overall minimum excise duly expn:ucd 
u%  or u  an amount per kilopam 
20% of  .retailsellin& price, incl. all taxes 
ECU IS per kiloaram 
(Art. l  of  Directive 92180) 
_/ AnnexD 
ANNUAL CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICES BETWEEN 1992 AND 1998 
1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992 
Belgium  1.8  1.7  2.3  1.7  2.8  3.5  2.3 
Denmark  2.5  .  2.1  2.1  2.0  1.6  0.6  2.0 
. Germany  2.2  2.1  1.9  1.9  2.8  4.0  4.9 
Greece  4.5  6.0  8.5  9.3  10.8  13.8  15.0 
Spain  2.2  2.1  3.4  4.7  4.8  5.6  6.4 
France  1.5  1.3  1.9  1.6  2.1  2.2  2.4 
Ireland  2.5  1.4  1.1  2.0  2.7  1.9  2.6 
Italy  2.2  2.2  4.3  5.8  4.6  5.4  5.6 
Luxembourg  1.7  1.6  1.4  0.7  2.3  4.1  3.4 
Netherlands  2.4  2.1  1.3  1.5  2.8  2.1  3.1 
Austria  2.1  1.9  2.5  1.5  3.J  3.3  3.9 
Portugal  2.1  2.2  3.3  4.2  5.1  6.6  9.1 
Finland  2.0  1.3  1.6  0.3  1.4  4.2  4.1 
Sweden  2.0  1.8  1.2  2.4  3.0  5.7  2.2 
United  2.4  2.4  2.6  2.6  2.2  3.4  5.0 
King_dom 
Total (all  2.2  2.1  2.6  3.0  3.2  4.1  4.7 
Member 
Statesl 
Source : Eurostat 